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Abstract
Suppose we have a pair of information channels, κ1, κ2, with a common input. The Blackwell order is a partial
order over channels that compares κ1 and κ2 by the maximal expected utility an agent can obtain when decisions
are based on the channel outputs. Equivalently, κ1 is said to be Blackwell-inferior to κ2 if and only if κ1 can
be constructed by garbling the output of κ2. A related partial order stipulates that κ2 is more capable than κ1 if
the mutual information between the input and output is larger for κ2 than for κ1 for any distribution over inputs.
A Blackwell-inferior channel is necessarily less capable. However, examples are known where κ1 is less capable
than κ2 but not Blackwell-inferior. We show that this may even happen when κ1 is constructed by coarse-graining
the inputs of κ2. Such a coarse-graining is a special kind of “pre-garbling” of the channel inputs. This example directly
establishes that the expected value of the shared utility function for the coarse-grained channel is larger than it is for
the non-coarse-grained channel. This contradicts the intuition that coarse-graining can only destroy information and
lead to inferior channels. We also discuss our results in the context of information decompositions.
Keywords: Channel preorders; Blackwell order; degradation order; garbling; more capable; coarse-graining
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose we are given the choice of two channels that both provide information about the same random variable,
and that we want to make a decision based on the channel outputs. Suppose that our utility function depends on
the joint value of the input to the channel and our resultant decision based on the channel outputs. Suppose as well
that we know the precise conditional distributions defining the channels, and the distribution over channel inputs.
Which channel should we choose? The answer to this question depends on the choice of our utility function as
well as on the details of the channels and the input distribution. So for example, without specifying how we will
use the channels, in general we cannot just compare their information capacities to choose between them.
Nonetheless, for certain pairs of channels we can make our choice, even without knowing the utility functions
or the distribution over inputs. Let us represent the two channels by two (column) stochastic matrices κ1 and κ2,
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2respectively. Then if there exists another stochastic matrix λ such that κ1 = λ · κ2, there is never any reason to
strictly prefer κ1; for if we choose κ2, we can always make our decision by chaining the output of κ2 through
the channel λ and then using the same decision function we would have used had we chosen κ1. This simple
argument shows that whatever the three stochastic matrices are and whatever the decision rule we would use if we
chose channel κ1, we can always get the same expected utility by instead choosing channel κ2 with an appropriate
decision rule. In this kind of situation, where κ1 = λ · κ2, we say that κ1 is a garbling (or degradation) of κ2. It
is much more difficult to prove that the converse also holds true:
Theorem 1 (Blackwell’s theorem [1]). Let κ1, κ2 be two stochastic matrices representing two channels with the
same input alphabet. Then the following two conditions are equivalent:
1) When the agent chooses κ2 (and uses the decision rule that is optimal for κ2), her expected utility is always
at least as big as the expected utility when she chooses κ1 (and uses the optimal decision rule for κ1),
independent of the utility function and the distribution of the input S.
2) κ1 is a garbling of κ2.
Blackwell formulated his result in terms of a statistical decision maker who reacts to the outcome of a statistical
experiment. We prefer to speak of a decision problem instead of a statistical experiment. See [2], [3] for an overview.
Blackwell’s theorem motivates looking at the following partial order over channels κ1, κ2 with a common input
alphabet:
κ1  κ2 :⇐⇒
one of the two statementsin Blackwell’s theorem holds true.
We call this partial order the Blackwell order (this partial order is called degradation order by other authors [4],
[5]). If κ1  κ2, then κ1 is said to be Blackwell-inferior to κ2. Strictly speaking, the Blackwell order is only a
preorder, since there are channels κ1 6= κ2 that satisfy κ1  κ2  κ1 (when κ1 arises from κ2 by permuting the
output alphabet). However, for our purposes such channels can be considered as equivalent. We write κ1 ≺ κ2 if
κ1  κ2 and κ1 6 κ2. By Blackwell’s theorem this implies that κ2 performs at least as good as κ1 in any decision
problem and that there exist decision problems in which κ2 outperforms κ1.
For a given distribution of S, we can also compare κ1 and κ2 by comparing the two mutual informations I(S;X1),
I(S;X2) between the common input S and the channel outputs X1 and X2. The data processing inequality shows
that κ2  κ1 implies I(S;X2) ≥ I(S;X1). However, the converse implication does not hold. The intuitive reason
is that for the Blackwell order, not only the amount of information is important. Rather, the question is how much
of the information that κ1 or κ2 preserve is relevant for a given fixed decision problem (that is, a given fixed utility
function).
Given two channels κ1, κ2, suppose that I(S;X2) ≥ I(S;X1) for all distributions of S. In this case, we say that
κ2 is more capable than κ1. Does this imply that κ1  κ2? The answer is known to be negative in general [6]. In
Proposition 3 we introduce a new surprising example of this phenomenon with a particular structure. In fact, in this
example, κ1 is a Markov approximation of κ2 by a deterministic function, in the following sense: Consider another
3random variable f(S) that arises from S by applying a (deterministic) function f . Given two random variables S,
X , denote by X ← S the channel defined by the conditional probabilities PX|S(x|s), and let κ2 := (X ← S) and
κ1 := (X ← f(S)) · (f(S) ← S). Thus, κ1 can be interpreted as first replacing S by f(S) and then sampling
X according to the conditional distribution PX|S(x|f(s)). Which channel is superior? Using the data processing
inequality, it is easy to see that κ1 is less capable than κ2. However, as Proposition 3 shows, in general κ1 6 κ2.
We call κ1 a Markov approximation, because the output of κ1 is independent of the input S given f(S). The
channel κ1 can also be obtained from κ2 by “pre-garbling” (Lemma 5); that is, there is another stochastic matrix λf
that satisfies κ1 = κ2 · λf . It is known that pre-garbling may improve the performance of a channel (but not its
capacity) as we recall in Section II. What may be surprising is that this can happen for pre-garblings of the form λf ,
which have the effect of coarse-graining according to f .
The fact that the more capable preorder does not imply the Blackwell order shows that “Shannon information,”
as captured by the mutual information, is not the same as “Blackwell information,” as needed for the Blackwell
decision problems. Indeed, our example explicitly shows that even though coarse-graining always reduces Shannon
information, it need not reduce Blackwell information. Finally, let us mention that there are further ways of
comparing channels (or stochastic matrices); see [5] for an overview.
Proposition 3 builds upon another effect that we find paradoxical: Namely, there exist random variables S,X1, X2
and there exists a function f : S → S ′ from the support of S to a finite set S′ such that the following holds:
1) S and X1 are independent given f(S).
2) (X1 ← f(S))  (X2 ← f(S)).
3) (X1 ← S) 6 (X2 ← S).
Statement 1) says that everything X1 knows about S, it knows through f(S). Statement 2) says that X2 knows
more about f(S) than X1. Still, 3) says that we cannot conclude that X2 knows more about S than X1. The
paradox illustrates that it is difficult to formalize what it means to “know more.”
Understanding the Blackwell order is an important aspect of understanding information decompositions; that is, the
quest to find new information measures that separate different aspects of the mutual information I(S;X1, . . . , Xk) of
k random variables X1, . . . , Xk and a target variable S (see the other contributions of this special issue and references
therein). In particular, [7] argues that the Blackwell order provides a natural criterion when a variable X1 has unique
information about S with respect to X2. We hope that the examples we present here are useful in developing intuition
on how information can be shared among random variables and how it behaves when applying a deterministic
function, such as a coarse-graining. Further implications of our examples on information decompositions are
discussed in [8]. In the converse direction, information decomposition measures (such as measures of unique
information) can be used to study the Blackwell order and deviations from the Blackwell order. We illustrate this
idea in Example 4.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: In Section II, we recall how pre-garbling can be used to
improve the performance of a channel. We also show that the pre-garbled channel will always be less capable
4and that simultaneous pre-garbling of both channels preserves the Blackwell order. In Section III, we state a few
properties of the Blackwell order, and we explain why we find these properties counter-intuitive and paradoxical. In
particular, we show that coarse-graining the input can improve the performance of a channel. Section IV contains
a detailed discussion of an example that illustrates these properties. In Section V we use the unqiue information
measure from [7], which has properties similar to the Le Cam’s deficiency, to illustrate deviations from the Blackwell
relation.
II. PRE-GARBLING
As discussed above (and as made formal in Blackwell’s theorem (Theorem 1)), garbling the output of a channel
(“post-garbling”) never increases the quality of a channel. On the other hand, garbling the input of a channel
(“pre-garbling”) may increase the performance of a channel, as the following example shows.
Example 1. Suppose that an agent can choose an action from a finite set A. She then receives a utility u(a, s) that
depends both on the chosen action a ∈ A and on the value s of a random variable S. Consider the channels
κ1 =
0.9 0
0.1 1
 and κ2 = κ1 ·
0 1
1 0
 =
0 0.9
1 0.1
 ,
and the utility function
s 0 0 1 1
a 0 1 0 1
u(s, a) 2 0 0 1
For uniform input the optimal decision rule for κ1 is
a(0) = 0, a(1) = 1
and the opposite
a(0) = 1, a(1) = 0
for κ2. The expected utility with κ1 is 1.4, while using κ2, it is slightly higher, 1.45.
It is also not difficult to check that neither of the two channels is a garbling of the other (cf. Prop. 3.22 in [5]).
The intuitive reason for the difference in the expected utilities is that the channel κ2 transmits one of the states
without noise and the other state with noise. With a convenient pre-processing, it is possible to make sure that the
relevant information for choosing an action and for optimizing expected utility is transmitted with less noise.
Note the symmetry of the example: Each of the two channels arises from the other by a convenient pre-processing,
since the pre-processing is invertible. Hence, the two channels are not comparable by the Blackwell order. In contrast,
two channels that only differ by an invertible garbling of the output are equivalent with respect to the Blackwell
order.
The pre-garbling in Example 1 is invertible, and so it is more aptly described as a pre-processing. In general,
though, pure pre-garbling and pure pre-processing are not easily distinguishable, and it is easy to perturb Example 1
5by adding noise without changing the conclusion. In Section III, we will present an example in which the pre-
garbling consists of coarse-graining. It is much more difficult to understand how coarse-graining can be used as
sensible pre-processing.
Even though pre-garbling can make a channel better (or, more precisely, more suited for a particular decision
problem at hand), pre-garbling cannot invert the Blackwell order:
Lemma 1. If κ1 ≺ κ2 · λ, then κ1 6 κ2.
Proof. Suppose that κ1 ≺ κ2 · λ. Then the capacity of κ1 is less than the capacity of κ2 · λ, which is bounded by
the capacity of κ2. Therefore, the capacity of κ1 is less than the capacity of κ2.
Also, it follows directly from Blackwell’s theorem that
κ1  κ2 implies κ1 · λ  κ2 · λ
for any channel λ, where the input and output alphabets of λ equal the input alphabet of κ1, κ2. Thus, pre-garbling
preserves the Blackwell order when applied to both channels simultaneously.
Finally, let us remark that certain kinds of simultaneous pre-garbling can also be “hidden” in the utility function:
Namely, in Blackwell’s theorem, it is not necessary to vary the distribution of S, as long as the support of the
(fixed) input distribution has full support S (that is, every state of the input alphabet of κ1 and κ2 appears with
positive probability). In this setting, it suffices to look only at different utility functions. When the input distribution
is fixed, it is more convenient to think in terms of random variables instead of channels, which slightly changes
the interpretation of the decision problem. Suppose we are given random variables S,X1, X2 and a utility function
u(a, s) depending on the value of S and an action a ∈ A as above. If we cannot look at both X1 and X2, should
we rather look at X1 or at X2 to take our decision?
Theorem 2 (Blackwell’s theorem for random variables [7]). The following two conditions are equivalent:
1) Under the optimal decision rule, when the agent chooses X2, her expected utility is always at least as big
as the expected utility when she chooses X1, independent of the utility function.
2) (X1 ← S)  (X2 ← S).
III. PRE-GARBLING BY COARSE-GRAINING
In this section we present a few counter-intuitive properties of the Blackwell order.
Proposition 2. There exist random variables S,X1, X2 and a function f : S → S ′ from the support of S to a
finite set S′ such that the following holds:
1) S and X1 are independent given f(S).
2) (X1 ← f(S)) ≺ (X2 ← f(S)).
3) (X1 ← S) 6 (X2 ← S).
6This result may at first seem paradoxical. After all, property 3) implies that there exists a decision problem
involving S for which it is better to use X1 than X2. Property 1) implies that any information that X1 has about S
is contained in X1’s information about f(S). One would therefore expect that, from the viewpoint of X1, any
decision problem in which the task is to predict S and to react on S looks like a decision problem in which the
task is to react to f(S). But property 2) implies that for such a decision problem, it may in fact be better to look
at X2.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by Example 2, which will be given in Section IV. This example satisfies
1) S and X1 are independent given f(S).
2) (X1 ← f(S))  (X2 ← f(S)).
3) (X1 ← S) 6 (X2 ← S).
It only remains to show that it is possible to also achieve the strict relation (X1 ← f(S)) ≺ (X2 ← f(S)) in the
second statement. This can easily be done by adding a small garbling to the channel X1 ← f(S) (e.g. by adding a
binary symmetric channel with sufficiently small noise parameter ). This ensures (X1 ← f(S)) ≺ (X2 ← f(S)),
and if the garbling is small enough, this does not destroy the property (X1 ← S) 6 (X2 ← S).
The example from Proposition 2 also leads to the following paradoxical property:
Proposition 3. There exist random variables S,X and there exists a function f : S → S ′ from the support of S
to a finite set S′ such that the following holds:
(X ← f(S)) · (f(S)← S) 6 X ← S.
Let us again give a heuristic argument why we find this property paradoxical. Namely, the combined channel
(X ← f(S)) · (f(S) ← S) can be seen as a Markov chain approximation of the direct channel X ← S that
corresponds to replacing the conditional distribution
PX|S(x|s) =
∑
f(s)
PX|Sf(S)(x|s, f(s))Pf(S)|S(f(s)|s).
by ∑
f(s)
PX|f(S)(x|f(s))Pf(S)|S(f(s)|s).
Proposition 3 together with Blackwell’s theorem states that there exist situations where this approximation is better
than the correct channel.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let S,X1, X2 be as in Example 2 in Section IV that also proves Proposition 2, and let X =
X2. In that example, the two channels X1 ← f(S) and X2 ← f(S) are equal. Moreover, X1 and S are independent
given f(S). Thus, (X ← f(S)) · (f(S) ← S) = (X1 ← S). Therefore, the statement follows from (X1 ← S) 6
(X2 ← S).
On the other hand, the channel (X ← f(S)) · (f(S)← S) is always less capable than X ← S:
7Lemma 4. For any random variables S, X , and function f : S → S , the channel (X ← f(S)) · (f(S) ← S) is
less capable than X ← S.
Proof. For any distribution of S, let X ′ be the output of the channel (X ← f(S)) · (f(S) ← S). Then, X ′ is
independent of S given f(S). On the other hand, since f is a deterministic function, X ′ is independent of f(S)
given S. Together, this implies I(S;X ′) = I(f(S);X ′). Using the fact that the joint distributions of (X, f(S)) and
(X ′, f(S)) are identical and applying the data processing inequality gives
I(S;X ′) = I(f(S);X ′) = I(f(S);X) ≤ I(S;X).
The setting of Proposition 3 can also be understood as a specific kind of pre-garbling. Namely, consider the
channel λf defined by
λfs′,s := PS|f(S)(s
′|f(s)).
The effect of this channel can be characterized as a randomization of the input: The precise value of S is forgotten,
and only the value of f(S) is preserved. Then a new value s′ is sampled for S according to the conditional
distribution of S given f(S).
Lemma 5. (X ← f(S)) · (f(S)← S) = (X ← S) · λf .
Proof.
∑
s1
PX|S(x|s1)PS|f(S)(s1|f(s)) =
∑
s1,t
PX|S(x|s1)PS|f(S)(s1|t)Pf(S)|S(t|s)
=
∑
t
PX|f(S)(x|t)Pf(S)|S(t|s),
where we have used that X − S − f(S) forms a Markov chain.
While it is easy to understand that pre-garbling can be advantageous in general (since it can work as prepro-
cessing), we find surprising that this can also happen in the case where the pre-garbling is done in terms of a
function f ; that is, in terms of a channel λf that does coarse-graining.
IV. EXAMPLES
Example 2. Consider the joint distribution
f(s) s x1 x2 Pf(S)SX1X2
0 0 0 0 1/4
0 1 0 1 1/4
0 0 1 0 1/8
0 1 1 0 1/8
1 2 1 1 1/4
and the function f : {0, 1, 2} → {0, 1} with f(0) = f(1) = 0 and f(2) = 1. Then X1 and X2 are independent
uniform binary random variables, and f(S) = AND(X1, X2). By symmetry, the joint distributions of the pairs
8(f(S), X1) and (f(S), X2) are identical, and so the two channels X1 ← f(S) and X2 ← f(S) are identical. In
particular (X1 ← f(S))  (X2 ← f(S)).
On the other hand, consider the utility function
s a u(s, a)
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 0
2 0 0
2 1 1
To compute the optimal decision rule, let us look at the conditional distributions:
s x1 PS|X1(s|x1)
0 0 1/2
1 0 1/2
0 1 1/4
1 1 1/4
2 1 1/2
s x2 PS|X2(s|x2)
0 0 3/4
1 0 1/4
0 1 0
1 1 1/2
2 1 1/2
The optimal decision rule for X1 is a(0) = 0, a(1) = 1, with expected utility
uX1 := 1/2 · 1/2 + 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/2.
The optimal decision rule for X2 is a(0) = 0, a(1) ∈ {0, 1} (this is not unique in this case), with expected utility
uX2 := 1/2 · 1/4 + 1/2 · 1/2 = 3/8 < 1/2.
How can we understand this example? Some observations:
• It is easy to see that X2 has more irrelevant information than X1: namely, X2 can determine relatively precisely
when S = 0. However, since S = 0 gives no utility independent of the action, this information is not relevant.
It is more difficult to understand why X2 has less relevant information than X1. Surprisingly, X1 can determine
more precisely when S = 1: If S = 1, then X1 “detects this” (in the sense that X1 chooses action 0) with
probability 2/3. For X2, the same probability is only 1/3.
• The conditional entropies of S given X2 are smaller than the conditional entropies of S given X1:
H(S|X1 = 0) = log(2), H(S|X1 = 1) = 32 log(2),
H(S|X2 = 0) = 2 log(2)− 32 log(3) ≈ 0.4150375 log(2), H(S|X2 = 1) = log(2).
• One can see in which sense f(S) captures the relevant information for X1, and indeed for the whole decision
problem: knowing f(S) is completely sufficient in order to receive the maximal utility for each state of S.
However, when information is incomplete, it matters how the information about the different states of S is
9mixed, and two variables X1, X2 that have the same joint distribution with f(S) may perform differently. It is
somewhat surprising that it is the random variable that has less information about S and that is conditionally
independent of S given f(S) which actually performs better.
Example 2 is different from the pre-garbling Example 1 discussed in Section II. In the latter, both channels had
the same amount of information (mutual information) about S, but for the given decision problem the information
provided by κ2 was more relevant than the information provide by κ1. The first difference in Example 2 is that
X1 has less mutual information about S than X2 (Lemma 4). Moreover, both channels are identical with respect
to f(S), i.e. they provide the same information about f(S), and for X1 it is the only information it has about S.
So, one could argue that X2 has additional information, that does not help though, but decreases the expected
utility instead.
We give another example which shows that X2 can also be chosen a deterministic function of S.
Example 3. Consider the joint distribution
f(s) s x1 x2 Pf(S)SX1X2
0 0 0 0 1/6
0 0 1 0 1/6
0 1 0 1 1/6
0 1 1 1 1/6
1 2 1 1 1/3
The function f is as above, but now also X2 is a function of S. Again, the two channels X1 ← f(S) and X2 ← f(S)
are identical, and X1 is independent of S given f(S). Consider the utility function
s a u(s, a)
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
2 0 0
2 1 −1
One can show that it is optimal for agent who relies on X2 to always choose action 0, which brings no reward
(and no loss). However, when the agent knows that X1 is zero, he may safely choose action 1 and has a positive
probability of receiving a positive reward.
To add another interpretation to the last example, we visualize the situation in the following Bayesian network:
X ← S → f(S)→ X ′,
where, as in Proposition 3 and its proof, we let X = X2, and we consider X ′ = X1 as an approximation of X .
Then S denotes the state of the system that we are interested in, and X denotes a given set of observables of
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interest. f(S) can be considered as a “proxy” in situations where it is difficult to observe X directly. For example,
in neuroimaging, instead of directly measuring the neural activity X , one might look at an MRI signal f(S). In
economic and social sciences, monetary measures like the GDP are used as a proxy for prosperity.
A decision problem can always be considered as a classification problem defined by the utility u(s, a) by
considering the optimal action as the class label of state S. Proposition 3 now says that there exist S,X, f(S) and
a classifcation problem u(s, a), such that the approximated features X ′ (simulated from f(S)) allow for a better
classification (higher utility) than the original features X .
In such a situation, looking at f(S) will always be better than looking at either X or X ′. Thus, the paradox
will only play a role in situations where it is not possible to base the decision on f(S) directly. For example, f(S)
might still be too large, or X might have a more natural interpretation, making it easier to interpret for the decision
taker. But, when it is better to base a decision on a proxy rather than directly on the observable of interest, this
interpretation may be erroneous.
V. INFORMATION DECOMPOSITION AND LE CAM DEFICIENCY
Given two channels κ1, κ2, how can one decide whether or not κ1  κ2? The easiest way is to check whether
the equation κ1 = λ · κ2 has a solution λ that is a stochastic matrix. In the finite alphabet case, this amounts to
checking feasibility of a linear program, which is considered computationally easy. However, when the feasibility
check returns a negative result, this approach does not give any more information, e.g. how far κ1 is away from
being a garbling of κ2. A function that quantifies how far κ1 is away from being a garbling of κ2 is given by the
(Le Cam) deficiency and its various generalizations [9]. Another such function is given by UI defined in [7] that
takes into account that the channels we consider are of the form κ1 = (X1 ← S) and κ2 = (X2 ← S), that is,
they are derived from conditional distributions of random variables. In contrast to the deficiencies, UI depends on
the input distribution to these channels.
Let PSX1X2 be a joint distribution of S and the outputs X1 and X2. Let ∆P be the set of all joint distributions
of the random variables S,X1, X2 (with the same alphabets) that are compatible with the marginal distributions of
PSX1X2 for the pairs (S,X1) and (S,X2), i.e.,
∆P :=
{
QSX1X2 ∈ ∆ : QSX1 = PSX1 , QSX2 = PSX2
}
.
In other words, ∆P consists of all joint distributions that are compatible with κ1 and κ2 and that have the same
distribution for S as PSX1X2 . Consider the function
UI(S;X1\X2) := min
Q∈∆P
IQ(S;X1|X2),
where IQ denotes the conditional mutual information evaluated with respect to the the joint distribution Q. This
function has the following property: UI(S;X1\X2) = 0 if and only if κ1  κ2 [7]. Computing UI is a convex
optimization problem. However, the condition number can be very bad, which makes the problem difficult in
practice.
UI is interpreted in [7] as a measure of the unique information that X1 conveys about S (with respect to X2).
So, for instance, with this interpretation Example 2 can be summarized as follows: Neither X1 nor X2 has unique
11
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Fig. 1: Heatmaps for the function UI in (a) Example 4, and (b) Example 5.
information about f(S). However, both variables have unique information about S, although X1 is conditionally
independent of S given f(S) and thus, in contrast to X2, contains no “additional” information about S. We now
apply UI to a parameterized version of the AND gate in Example 2.
Example 4. Figure 1a shows a heat map of UI computed on the set of all distributions of the form
f(s) s x1 x2 Pf(S)SX1X2
0 0 0 0 1/8 + 2b
0 1 0 0 1/8− 2b
0 0 0 1 1/8 + a
0 1 0 1 1/8− a
0 0 1 0 1/8 + a/2 + b
0 1 1 0 1/8− a/2− b
1 2 1 1 1/4
where −1/8 ≤ a ≤ 1/8 and −1/16 ≤ b ≤ 1/16. This is the set of distributions of S,X1, X2 that satisfy the following
constraints:
1) X1, X2 are independent;
2) f(S) = AND(X1, X2), where f is as in Example 2; and
3) X1 is independent of S given f(S).
Along the secondary diagonal b = a/2, the marginal distributions of the pairs (S,X1) and (S,X2) are identical. In
such a situation, the channels (X1 ← S) and (X2 ← S) are Blackwell-equivalent, and so UI vanishes. Furtheraway
from the diagonal, the marginal distributions differ, and UI grows. The maximum value is achieved at the corners
for (a, b) = (−1/8, 1/16), (1/8,−1/16). At the upper left corner (a, b) = ±(−1/8, 1/16), we recover Example 2.
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Example 5. Figure 1b shows a heat map of UI computed on the set of all distributions of the form
f(s) s x1 x2 Pf(S)SX1X2
0 0 0 0 a2/(a+b)
0 0 1 0 ab/(a+b)
0 1 0 1 ab/(a+b)
0 1 1 1 b2/(a+b)
1 2 1 1 1− a− b
where a, b ≥ 0 and a + b ≤ 1. This extends Example 3, which is recovered for a = b = 1/3. This is the set of
distributions of S,X1, X2 that satisfy the following constraints:
1) X2 is a function of S, where the function is as in Example 3.
2) X1 is independent of S given f(S).
3) The channels X1 ← f(S) and X2 ← f(S) are identical.
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